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The Bounds Of Power: Judicial Rule-Making In
Illinois
INTRODUCTION

The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers' distributes
authority among governmental departments, purportedly to prevent excessive accumulation of power in any single branch.' In Illinois, the courts have steadily shifted the boundaries between legislative and judicial power.3 Recently, the Illinois courts have adopted
a construction of judicial power that asserts dominance over court
rule-making, 4 while abandoning a prior concept of concurrent' authority exercised by the judiciary and the legislature. This expansionist concept of judicial authority culminated in People v.
Jackson, where the Illinois Supreme Court held that one of its rules
would supersede any conflicting legislative enactment.'
This note examines the evolution of the separation of powers doctrine as applied to court rule-making authority, focusing attention
on the court's departure from concurrent rule-making, as explicated
1. "The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise
powers properly belonging to another." ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (1970).
2. In re Estate of Barker, 63 111. 2d 113, 119, 345 N.E.2d 484, 488 (1976).
3. People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 111. 2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495 (1968); People v. Lobb, 17
Ill. 2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959); Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 111. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713
(1952); People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934); People v. Kelly, 347 111.221, 179
N.E. 898 (1932). These decisions are comparable to those made by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950), and by the Connecticut
Supreme Court in State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 353 A.2d 723 (1975). Winberry held that
the state's constitutional grant of rule-making authority to the state supreme court "subject
to law" meant merely subject to substantive law. The result was an absolute grant of procedural rule-making power to the New Jersey Supreme Court. Clemente held that the state
legislature lacked any authority to enact rules regarding either practice or administration
binding the state supreme court, thus declaring rule-making power to be the exclusive province of the judiciary.
4. People v. Jackson, 69 Ill. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977); People v. Walker, 58 111.App.
3d 323, 374 N.E.2d 490 (1978); People v. Menken, 54 Ill. App. 3d 199, 369 N.E.2d 363 (1977);
People v. Thornton, 54 Ill. App. 3d 202, 369 N.E.2d 358 (1977); People v. Brumfield, 51 111.
App. 3d 637, 366 N.E.2d 1130 (1977).
5. See People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 111.2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495 (1968); Agran v.
Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713 (1952); People v. Brumfield, 51 Ill. App. 3d
637, 366 N.E.2d 1130 (1977). Although the 1970 Constitutional Convention characterized the
court rule-making function as "concurrent," 2 RwcoRD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVxErITON 1067 (1969-1970) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS], it should have
been depicted as complementary. Concurrent power implies the joint exercise of authority
over a single function. In actuality, control over some matters was delegated to the legislature,
reserving the remainder to the judiciary. Id.
6. 69 Ill. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977).
7. Id. at 260, 371 N.E.2d at 606.
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in People v. Jackson. The constitutional implications of Jackson are
also discussed. Finally, this note addresses the unresolved issues
engendered by Jackson, particularly those concerning the Illinois
Civil Practice Act 8 and the proposed Illinois evidence rules.,
THE SCOPE OF THE RULE-MAKING POWER

There are two methods of interpreting the doctrine of separation
of powers. One theory delegates all governmental functions of a
particular nature to the exclusive control of a single department.' 0
The other method allocates authority among the branches, to be
exercised concurrently."
Illinois courts have rejected the former approach, refusing to literally construe the separation doctrine." Instead, the courts have created a concept of overlapping, concurrent powers.'" This posture is
attributable to the ambiguous treatment of the separation of powers
doctrine in successive Illinois constitutions." While all these constitutions have expressly prohibited a governmental branch from exercising a power "properly belonging" to another department, 5 none
has delineated those functions which "properly" belong within each
department.' 6 In the absence of any definitive boundary between the
rule-making authority vested in each branch of government, both
the judiciary and the legislature have adopted court rules.'7 Furthermore, the Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1969-1970 espoused
the concurrent rule-making approach and delegated to the courts
the task of establishing the boundary between the legislature and
the judiciary.' 8
8. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 1-94 (1977).
9. Repeated proposals for codification of Illinois' common law evidence rules have been
considered, most recently during the summer of 1978.
10. See Field v. People, 3 Ill. 79, 83-84 (1839).
11. In re Estate of Barker, 63 Ill. 2d 113, 119, 345 N.E.2d 484, 487-488 (1976); City of
Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board, 57 Ill. 2d 170, 173-74, 311 N.E.2d 146, 148 (1974).
12. See People v. Kelly, 347 Ill. 221, 233, 179 N.E. 898, 903 (1932); People v. Thornton, 54
Ill. App. 3d 202, 208, 369 N.E.2d 358, 362 (1977) (Green, J., specially concurring.)
13. "All the court decisions of this state recognize that there is an overlap-that there is
not a strict division between the three areas of government, but that there is an overlap." 2
PROCEEDINGS 1067 (1969-1970). See People v. Lobb, 17 Ill.2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959); Agran
v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713 (1952); People v. Kelly, 347 Ill. 221, 234-35,
179 N.E.2d 898, 903 (1932).
14. See ILL. CONST. of 1818, arts. 3, 6; ILL. CONST. of 1870, arts. 2, 6; ILL. CONST. art. 2, §
1 and art. 6 (1970).
15. ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (1970).
16. Compare ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 1 and art. 6, § 1 with art. 2, § 1.
17. Rules promulgated by the legislature have been codified in the Illinois Civil Practice
Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 §§ 1-94 (1977). Rules adopted by the judiciary have been compiled in Illinois Supreme Court Rules, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A §§ 1-910 (1970).

18.

6 PROCEEDINGS 825 (1969-1970).
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Lack of a precise delineation of judicial power enables the Illinois
Supreme Court to describe its own authority. 9 In determining the
scope of judicial authority the court has used English common law,
the Illinois Constitution," the inherent power doctrine, the distinction between substantive and procedural law, and the procedural
distinction between practice and administration.
TraditionalJudicial Power
Although Illinois courts have relied upon English common law2 '
to determine the bounds of judicial power, salient differences between English and Illinois courts 2 make that reliance inappropriate.
Early English courts were vested with rule-making authority to regulate both court practice and administration,23 whereas Illinois
courts are limited in their control of trial matters to administrative
and supervisory rule-making.24 The responsibility for granting relief
through the issuance of the King's writs25 enabled the courts to
promulgate much substantive law.26 Illinois courts, however, may
only create substantive law by rule of decision.2
Early English courts derived the authority to perform these broad
judicial functions from the King, who defined the scope of these
activities.28 As arms of the Crown, the courts depended upon the
King's strength to enforce their rules and decisions.2" The constitutional origin of Illinois judicial power is the clearest distinction between the judicial power of the English common law courts and that
exercised by contemporary Illinois courts. 30 The judiciary article of
19. The drafters, unable to agree as to the desirable limits of the rulemaking
power of the two bodies, deliberately refrained from speaking to that question and
left that issue as it existed prior to 1962 with the refinements of the question to be
decided on a case by case basis.
People v. Thornton, 54 Ill. App. 3d 202, 207, 369 N.E.2d 358, 362 (1977) (Green, J., specially
concurring).
20. ILL. CONST. art 6 (1970).
21. Compare Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926) with
Trumbull, Judicial Responsibility for Regulating Practiceand Procedure in Illinois, 47
Nw.U.L.REv. 443 (1952).
22. See Comment, The Inherent Power of Courts to Formulate Rules of Practice,29 ILL.
L. REv. 911, 914-15 (1935).
23. For a complete review of these developments, see People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192
N.E. 634 (1934).
24. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 16 (1970).
25.

T. PLucKNE'rr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 353-424 (5th ed. 1956).

26. "The mere fact that the English Courts did make most of the procedural law proves
too much since they made most of the substantive law as well." Trumbull, JudicialResponsibility for Regulating Practiceand Procedure in Illinois, 47 Nw.U.L.Rsv. 443, 445 (1952).
27. See note 46 infra and accompanying text.
28. T. PLucK T'rr,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 104 (5th ed. 1956).
29. Id.
30. ILL. CONST. art. 6 (1970).
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the Illinois constitution creates a discrete, independent governmental entity, fully endowed with its own particular authority.
The judiciary article vests all judicial power in the Supreme,
appellate, and circuit courts.' The Supreme Court is authorized to
promulgate rules governing appeals, 3 and is empowered with
"general administrative and supervisory"' ' rule-making authority to
expedite judicial processes. The drafters of the 1970 Illinois Constitution sought to retain the concurrent rule-making approach which
had been advanced by Illinois courts. 34 The distribution of rulemaking power between the judiciary and the legislature was left to
35
the court to determine.

The judiciary article's enumerations are subject to several interpretations. One approach restricts judicial power to those-functions
specifically described by the article, admitting nothing additional."
Conversely, express enumerations have been regarded as designations of exclusivity, 37 forbidding other departments from exercising
functions specifically assigned to the judiciary. The commonly-held
view is that these enumerations are merely exemplary, and are supplemented by inherent judicial power.3' Thus, embodied in the constitutional grant of judicial authority is the underlying assumption
that the courts possess inherent power.
Inherent Judicial Power
Illinois courts have long recognized the existence of inherent judicial power 3' arising independently of any constitutional grant. In31. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 1 (1970).
32. Id. §§ 4(b)-(c), 6.
33. Id. § 16.
34. "The Committee did not intend to effect a change in the common law which has
developed from the [language of the present judiciary article]." 6 PROCEEDINGS 566 (19691970).
35. Id. at 825.
36. See 6 PROCEEDINGS 1326 (1969-1970) where the same analysis was applied to the
legislative enumerations. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
37. Note, People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones:A Restraint on Legislative Revision of the Illinois
Supreme Court Rules, 6 J.MAR.J.PRAc. & PRoc. 382, 392 (1973); 6 PROCEEDINGS 812-27 (19691970).
38. See Johnson v. State Electoral Board, 53 Ill.
2d 256, 290 N.E.2d 886 (1972).
39. Inherent power has been described as "universally recognized," People v. Lobb, 17 111.
2d 287, 299, 161 N.E.2d 325, 332, (1959); "irrefutable," Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practiceand
Procedure:A Study of JudicialRulemaking, 55 MIcH. L. Rav. 623, 626 (1957); and "settled,"
Trumbull, Judicial Responsibility for Regulating Practice and Procedure in Illinois, 47
Nw.U.L.Rav. 443, 448 (1952). Despite these generous suppositions, the definition of inherent
power has remained nebulous.
Section I of article VI of the constitution vests the judicial power in the courts
provided in or permitted to be created by the constitution. While the constitution
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herent judicial power has been justified by the traditional role of
courts as rulemakers'0 and adjudicators." For example, since the
resolution of legal disputes requires interpretation of the common
law and of statutory provisions, this function has been deemed exclusively and inherently judicial."
Two corollaries emerge from the concept of inherent judicial
power. First, power which is inherently judicial cannot be diminished or negated by legislative enactment." The legislature lacks
authority to subordinate judicial power, since it exists independently of legislative delegation." Similarly, inherent power cannot
be abolished by a constitutional amendment because it is not dependent upon constitutional mandate for its existence." Secondly,
the courts possess control over court rules to facilitate the rendering
of judgments pursuant to their inherent power."
Circumscription of the courts' inherent power lies exclusively
within the discretion of the judiciary. 7 Using its inherent power, the
court has asserted its authority to delimit judicial rule-making. The
scope of the Supreme Court's rule-making function is governed by
doctrinal distinctions between substantive and procedural law, as
well as distinctions between court practice and administration. This
does not define what constitutes judicial power, it is an exclusive and exhaustive
grant vesting all such power in the courts.
Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 148-49, 105 N.E.2d 713, 725-726 (1952).
40. People v. Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d 287, 299, 161 N.E.2d 325, 327 (1959). However, the proposition that a function is necessarily inherent merely because it is traditional lacks support. See
Trumbull, Judicial Responsibility for Regulating Practice and Procedure in Illinois, 47
Nw.U.L.Rav. 443 (1952).
41. "It is evident that the rendition of judgments by the courts is one of the most important inherent judicial powers of the courts.
Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145,
150, 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1952).
42. Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976);
People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 158, 175 N.E. 400, 405 (1931).
43. The General Assembly has power to enact laws governing judicial practice
only where they do not unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary ....
It is the undisputed duty of the court to protect its judicial powers from
encroachment by legislative enactments, and thus preserve an independent judicial
department.
Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 149, 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1952).
44. In contrast, federal courts are dependent for their authority upon congressional grants.
U.S. CONST., art. 3. Congress is empowered to amend and repeal the federal rules governing
procedure. See also Trumbull, JudicialResponsibility for Regulating Practiceand Procedure
in Illinois, 47 Nw.U.L.Rav. 443, 446 (1952).
45. See Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713 (1952). The court noted
that prior to the ratification of the United States Constitution, courts promulgated rules "as
an attribute of their judicial powers." Id. at 149, 105 N.E.2d at 715.
46. Id. at 150, 105 N.E.2d at 715.
47. People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 Ill. 2d 62, 66, 237 N.E.2d 495, 498 (1968); People v.
Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 157, 175 N.E. 400, 404 (1931).
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examination begins by dividing laws generally between those re-

lated to substance and those concerned with procedure. When that
division has been established, a scrutiny of the procedural components, practice and administration will follow.
DistinguishingSubstance and Procedure
Illinois courts are forbidden to promulgate substantive law, since
that is the exclusive province of the legislature.'" The courts are
restricted to the formulation of procedural rules." The distinction
between substance and procedure is readily defineable; proceduralN
laws govern court activity, while substantive laws establish rights,
set duties, and grant relief.5' However, this distinction is extremely
difficult to apply, as substantive rights are often inextricably interwoven with procedural regulations.12 In the absence of constitutional
guidance, the distinction between substance and procedure falls to
judicial decision.
The courts have generally deferred to the legislature by awarding
a substantive label to laws falling within the gray area between
substance and procedure." Procedural rule-making has been perceived as a function performed concurrently 5 by the legislature and
the judiciary. Rules assigned to the procedural domain are further
48. See People v. Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959). It has been commented that,
"[while the courts necessarily make new substantive law through the decision of specific
cases coming before them, they are not to make substantive law wholesale through the
exercise of the rule-making power." Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature'sRelation to Judicial
Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HA.v. L. Rxv. 234, 239 (1951).
Courts are precluded from promulgating substantive rules so that legally enforceable rules of conduct . . . are considered, debated, and approved by chosen representatives of the people when those rules touch more than the mere workings of the
court machinery or the orderly dispatch of judicial business.
Note, The Rulemaking Powers of the Illinois Supreme Court, 1965 U.ILL.L.F. 903, 904.
49. Note, People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones: A Restraint on Legislative Revision of the Illinois
Supreme Court Rules, 6 J.MAR.J.PRAc. & Poc. 382 (1973).
50. Procedure has been defined as "[t]he mode and order of... obtaining compensation
for an injury by an action or suit in the . . . courts, from the inception of such suit until it
ends in the final determination of the court of last resort.
... Fleischman v. Walker, 91
Ill. 318, 320 (1878).
51. As a general rule laws which fix duties, establish rights and responsibilities
among and for persons, . . . are substantive in character[,] while those which
merely prescribe the manner in which such rights and responsibilities may be
exercised and enforced in court are procedural ...
Note, The Rulemaking Powers of the Illinois Supreme Court, 1965 U.ILL.L.F. 903, 904.
52. See, e.g., Dead Man Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 2 (1977).
53. See Note, The Rulemaking Powers of the Illinois Supreme Court, 1965 U.ILL.L.F. 903,
914.
54. Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 149, 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1952); See also H.
FINS, ILUNOIS COURT PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW JuDICIAL AITicLE (United States Law Printing
1964).
55. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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categorized, delegating matters of practice to the legislature while
reserving administrative concerns to the judiciary.
DistinguishingAdministration and Practice
Function provides the distinction between court practice and
court administration. Practice rules prescribe the manner in which
litigants seek resolution of legal controversies. 5 Administrative
rules dictate routines to promote court efficiency.57 Through a constitutional grant of "general administrative and supervisory authority"58 the judicial branch has express control over court administration: docketing, timing rules, assignment of judges, and pre-trial
activities.5 ' That authority, specifically carved away from the sovereign powers of the legislature, has become exclusive to the judiciary. ® Regulation of court practice rules, the second component of
procedural law, remains with the legislature, both because it has not
been particularly granted to another governmental branch,6' and
because practice rules may affect substantive rights. 2 Courts practice rules regulate such matters as where a controversy may be
heard, what parties may be joined, whether parties are at issue, and
when a verdict may be rendered.65
The power to determine whether a rule governs administration or
practice lies within the interpretive capacity of the court.6 That
power derives from the court's role as the final interpreter of the
constitution. 5 That interpretive power is aptly applied to the characterization of law as a matter of practice or of administration. The
56. See People v. Raymond, 186 Ill.
407, 414-415, 57 N.E. 1066, 1069 (1900). See also
Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practiceand Procedure:A Study of JudicialRulemaking, 55 MICH.
L. Rav. 623, 635 (1957).
57. The purpose of delegating administrative authority to the courts was to "strengthen
the concept of an effective centralized administration of the judicial system." 6 PROCEMINGS
813-814 (1969-1970).
58. ILL. CoNST. art. 6, § 16 (1970).

59.
60.
61.

4

PROCEEDiNGS

688, 690 (1969-1970).

See People v. Brumfield, 51 Ill. App. 3d 637, 644, 366 N.E.2d 1130, 1136 (1977).
All legislative power is vested in the General Assembly, subject to the restrictions contained in the constitution. Every subject within the scope of civil
government which is not withdrawn from the authority of the legislature may be
acted upon by it.
Taylorville Sanitary District v. Winslow, 317 ll. 25, 27, 147 N.E. 401, 402 (1925).
62. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
63.
L. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 1-94 (1977).
64. See People v. Thornton, 54 111. App. 3d 202, 369 N.E.2d 358 (1977) (Green, J., specially
concurring), for a recent example of the exercise of this authority.
65. "[Tlhe power of the court to make rules governing . . .procedure is one which is
inherent in the court.
...
People v. Brumfield, 51 Ill.
App. 3d 637, 643, 366 N.E.2d 1130,
1135 (1977).
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discretion to categorize and define rule-making functions has resulted in a steady expansion of judicial authority.
JUDICIAL EXPANSIONISM: PEOPLE V. JACKSON

The Evolution of Court Rule-Making Priorto Jackson
When first confronted with a conflict between a statute and a
supreme court rule, Illinois courts deferred to the legislature. In
Angel v. Plume & Atwood Mfg. Co.," the Illinois Supreme Court
held that a statute governing the docketing of cases prevailed over
a contrary supreme court rule. Despite the essentially administrative nature of the docketing rule, the court deferred to the legislative
enactment. Legislative deference was reiterated in Rozier v.
Williams, 7 where the court allowed a statute requiring purchase of
an appeal bond to preclude a court rule abrogating the prerequisite." Thus, in this deferential period, the court relinquished control
of an appellate process, traditionally judicial," and conferred it
upon the legislature.
As the judiciary attained greater legitimacy, 0 the courts assumed
a complementary stance, acquiring wider latitude in judicial rulemaking, and explicitly prohibiting the legislature from transgressing upon inherently judicial powers. 7 People v. Callopy12 exhibited

slight broadening of judicial authority through the court's resolution
of a challenge to a rule requiring written jury instructions in criminal cases. The court declared that the judiciary was authorized to
promulgate rules for court procedure, absent a legislative enactment.73
Agran v. Checker Taxi Co.7" achieved considerable judicial expansion. The Illinois Supreme Court asserted control over the mechanism for dismissal of cases for want of prosecution, reasoning that
66.
67.
68.

73 Ill. 412 (1874).
92 111.187 (1879).
While circuit courts, and other courts of record, have undoubted power to
make all reasonable rules for the transaction of the business of the courts, yet their
rules must be in furtherance of law, and not in contravention of it. All rules of court
must be subordinate to the general laws of the State, and such as are not are [sic]
binding on no one.
Id. at 190.
69. See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
70. Trumbull, Judicial Responsibility for Regulating Practiceand Procedure in Illinois,
47 Nw.U.L.Rev. 443, 448 (1952).
71. People v. Kelly, 347 Ill. 221, 235, 179 N.E. 898, 903 (1932).
72. 358 IIl. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934).
73. Consistent with its previous deferential approach, the court added the caveat that
should the legislature later act in this area, the court would be required to conform its rule
to the statutory scheme. Id. at 13, 192 N.E. at 635.
74. 412 Ill.
145, 105 N.E.2d 713 (1952).
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a statute governing this matter impermisssibly infringed upon the
court's inherent power to render judgments. 5 Agran was noteworthy
both for its reliance upon an enhanced view of inherent power, and
for its decisive interjection of judicial authority into the realm of
trial procedure. The Agran approach was re-emphasized in People
v. Lob b 76 when the court based its authority to create a voir dire rule
which was "consistent with constitutional safeguards" ' upon inherent judicial power. Each of these interpretations successively advanced the bounds of judicial rule-making power.
This incremental trend was dramatically accelerated by the
court's exposition in People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones,7" which first
articulated judicial dominance over rule-making authority through
invalidation of a statute governing admission to bail that conflicted
with a supreme court rule. 9 The court espoused the view that the
power to promulgate rules for the appellate process was constitutionally entrusted solely to the courts; therefore, the legislative enactment was an impermissible intrusion upon an exclusively judicial domain. Although the conflicting provisions were procedural
in nature, both affected the substantive right of admission to bail.8 l
Justification for the Jones court's assertion of judicial dominance
may be found in the constitutional provision which confers the authority to regulate appeals upon the court." Yet, in effect, the judiciary exerted control over a largely substantive issue under the guise
of regulating appellate procedure.
The Illinois courts exhibited further departure from previous judicial restraint in decisions subsequent to Jones. Conflicting statutes
were invalidated even where they regulated matters over which the
judiciary had not been expressly granted exclusive authority.s3 The
Illinois appellate courts defined the permissible scope of judicial
75. Id. at 150, 105 N.E.2d at 715.
76. 17 111. 2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959).
77. Id. at 299, 161 N.E.2d at 332.
7S. 40 I1. 2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495 (1968).
79. Id. at 66, 237 N.E.2d at 498.
80. Id.
81. The right of admission to bail is substantive in the sense that it is integrally related
to the constitutional right to liberty of the person. Admission to bail is governed generally
by statute. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110 (1977).
82. IM. CONsi'. art. 6, §§ 4(b)-(c), 6.
83. See People v. Walker, 58 fll. App. 3d 323, 374 N.E.2d 490 (1978); People v. Menken,
App. 3d 202, 369 N.E.2d
App. 3d 199, 369 N.E.2d 363 (1977); People v. Thornton, 54 Ill.
54 Ill.
358 (1977); People v. Brumfield, 51 Il.App. 3d 637, 366 N.E.2d 1130 (1977). See also Fins,
Impropriety of Illinois Legislature'sInfringement Upon the ConstitutionalRule-Making Authority of the Supreme Court, 66 ILL. B. J. 384 (1978).
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authority by resolving the conflict between a statute," and a rule8'
regulating the conduct of voir dire examinations." The courts regarded the control of voir dire examination as falling within the
domain of inherent judicial authority and court administration."
The extension of judicial rule-making authority from the appellate
to the trial process culminated in People v. Jackson."
People v. Jackson
In People v. Jackson the Illinois Supreme Court asserted judicial
dominance over the regulation of voir dire proceedings.8 9 Jackson's
counsel had been denied the right to examine the jurors although
attorney-conducted voir dire was explicitly authorized by statute."
Instead, the jury had been selected pursuant to a court-conducted
voir dire examination, as prescribed by Illinois supreme court rule."
The trial court had refused to follow the statute, regarding it as an
unconstitutional encroachment upon the judicial domain. The appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court advanced the statute's constitutionality and challenged the supremacy accorded to the supreme
court rule.
In delivering its opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court employed an
oblique, conclusory style that left little space for inquiry into the
underlying reasons for its decision. The voir dire statute was voided
because it conflicted with a supreme court rule.2 The Jackson decision is clear in its stance that any statute addressing matters within
judicial control is voidable for its infringement into the judicial
domain. The court's reasoning appears to have followed an analysis
commencing with a definition of "judicial power."
Judicial power, as granted by the Illinois constitution, encompassed "everything necessary for the full performance of judicial
functions.' 3 The judiciary's "general administrative and supervi84. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4(f) (1977) provides for counsel to examine prospective
jurors.
85. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 234 (1977) restricts examination of prospective jurors to
questions from the bench.
86. Voir dire examination is the questioning of prospective jurors prior to their empanelment.
87. See People v. Walker, 58 111.App. 3d 323, 372 N.E.2d 490 (1978); People v. Menken,
54 Ill. App. 3d 199, 369 N.E.2d 363 (1977); People v. Thornton, 54 Ill. App. 3d 202, 369 N.E.2d
358 (1977); People v. Brumfield, 51 Ill. App. 3d 637, 366 N.E.2d 1130 (1977).
88. 69 111.2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977).
89. Id. at 260, 371 N.E.2d at 606.
90. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 115-4(f) (1977).
91. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 234 (1977).
92. 69 111.2d 252, 260, 371 N.E.2d 602, 606 (1977).
93. Id. at 257, 371 N.E.2d at 604.
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sory authority"" gave the Illinois Supreme Court supremacy over all
"properly judicial"9 5 activities, including voir dire examinations.
Thus, the enactment regulating voir dire constituted an unconstitutional infringement upon the judicial rule-making function.
In essence, the Jackson decision exemplifies the state supreme
court's assertion of supremacy in the realm of rule-making. Voir
dire, a matter of trial practice formerly characterized as a legislative
responsibility," was subsumed under judicial authority by means of
an expansive interpretation of "procedure" and "administration."
Moreover, Jackson departed from the commonly-held interpretation of the judiciary article's enumerations;9 7 control of voir dire was
not traditionally an inherent power, nor was it expressly conferred
upon the judiciary.
The significance of Jackson is twofold. The court's posture crystalizes a trend which rejects deference to the legislature and broadens judicial control over court procedure. Of equal import is the
concomitant shift in the relationship between the legislature and
the judiciary, signalling an alteration in the allocation of power.
Through the affirmation of judicial dominance, Jackson abandoned
concurrent rule-making, thus contravening the intentions of the
drafters of the Illinois Constitution. 8 As a result of this departure,
the legislature's role in the rule-making process has been greatly
subordinated. This judicial policy has far-reaching implications.
IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDED JUDICIAL POWER

Expanded judicial rule-making authority, as exemplified by
Jackson, poses two constitutional dilemmas: paralysis of the legislature's rule-making function, and judicial usurpation of the legislative function. Specifically, the altered concept of judicial power and
the concomitant judicial law-making role may have an adverse effect upon the Illinois Civil Practice Act and the proposed adoption
94. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 16 (1970).
95. 69 111. 2d 252, 256, 371 N.E.2d 602, 604 (1977).
96. The courts formerly deferred to the legislature in matters which did not fall clearly
within the category of procedure. See note 52 supra. Voir dire examination is an example of
an activity falling within the substance-procedure continuum, because of its genesis in the
constitutional right to trial by a jury of unprejudiced peers. See People v. Jackson, 69 111. 2d
252, 260, 371 N.E.2d 602, 606 (1977), in which the court reasoned that "if there were a
constitutional right for the parties, through their counsel, to interrogate prospective jurors
on their voir dire examination, then Supreme Court Rule 234 would be unconstitutional."
However, the court concluded that "the basic constitutional right is trial by an impartial jury.
That is all to which any litigant is entitled." Id.
97. See notes 35 through 37 supra and accompanying text.
98. People v. Thornton, 54 111.App. 3d 202, 207, 369 N.E.2d 358, 362 (1977) (Green, J.,
specially concurring).
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of uniform Illinois evidence rules."
Broadened judicial power threatens to prevent the legislature
from fully exercising its concurrent rule-making responsibilities."3
The legislature has long pursued an aggressive course in rulemaking,' 01 prodding the court to take similar action. Pursuant to
current decisions, legislative encroachment upon the judicial function would render an enactment void even if promulgated to remedy
judicial inaction. The legislature may hesitate to fill a procedural
void or revise an antiquated rule, fearing that the endeavor would
be invalidated. This reluctance would be exascerbated by the absence of any guidance as to what constitutes impermissible infringement upon the judiciary. Lack of direction is attributable to the
Illinois Supreme Court's extension of judicial powers well beyond
those explicitly enumerated in the judiciary article.'0 '
Further issues raised by Jackson are the policy ramifications of
augmented judicial rule-making power. Recent decisions reflect the
court's apparent resolution to place the judiciary beyond legislative
check.103 This result would undermine the public image of the judiciary, as the court would derive its authority from the exercise of sheer
constitutional force rather than through its express constitutional
grant.'04 Judicial encroachment upon the legislative domain carries
grave constitutional implications, both for the separation of powers
doctrine and the concept of legislative sovereignty. The legislative
power vested in the General Assembly encompasses "the basic
'sovereign' power of the state."'0 5 Subsequent grants of power to
other departments are merely carved away from that possessed by
the legislature. Thus, the legislative power is limited in scope only
by that authority which has been allocated to other branches.'"1 Yet,
under the facade of performing its expanded procedural and admin99. For an outline of the historical background of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, and a
brief discussion of the current progress of codified evidence rules for Illinois, see, Graham,
Introduction: The Illinois Supreme Court at the Threshold, 1978 U.Ill.L.F. 104, 107-10.
100. Note, People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones: A Restraint on Legislative Revision of the
Illinois Supreme Court Rules, 6 J.MAR.J.PRAc. & Paoc. 382, 392 (1973).
101. See Trumbull, Judicial Responsibility for Regulating Practice and Procedure in
Illinois, 47 Nw.U.L.REv. 443 (1952); contra Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary
ProcedureAre Void Constitutionally, 23 hL. L. Rsv. 276 (1928).
102. Note, The Rulemaking Powers of the Illinois Supreme Court, 1965 U.ILL.L.F. 903,
912.
103. See Fins, Impropriety of Illinois Legislature'sInfringement Upon the Constitutional
Rule-Making Authority of the Supreme Court, 66 ILL. B.J. 384 (1978); see also Bonaguro, The
Supreme Court's Exclusive Rulemaking Authority, 67 ILL. B.J. (1979).
104. See Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisalof Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HAIv. L. Rav. 234, 20-51, 254 (1951).
105. 6 PROCEEDiNGS 1364 (1969-1970).
106. Id. at 1364-65.
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istrative rule-making function, the court may alter substantive
rights with impunity.
The Illinois Civil PracticeAct
Expanded judicial rule-making could affect the viability of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act.0 7 Despite its acknowledgment of the Illinois Supreme Court's inherent rule-making powers,105 the Civil
Practice Act requires court rules to be consistent with statutory
provisions.0 9 Underlying the Act is the supposition that where a
statute and a supreme court rule are in conflict, the legislation
supercedes the judicial rule." 0 However, this premise was clearly
rejected by the Jackson court. Pursuant to Jackson, the legislature
may enact rules of court procedure, provided they are consistent
with those promulgated by the judiciary. The Supreme Court has
assumed the authority to formulate conflicting court rules that
would prevail over pre-existing statutes.
Although the Civil Practice Act is confined to court procedural
details, its provisions are intertwined with substantive rights."' The
extension of judicial control over matters covered by the Civil Practice Act would constitute an unwarranted intrusion into a heretofore
legislative realm."
The Evidence Rules
The ambiguity of the substance-procedure division underlies the
problem of determining which rule-making unit is authorized to
adopt evidence rules. Evidence has been considered the province of
107. "[I]n Illinois the law of procedure lies in the twilight zone of the legislative and
judicial departments. It is governed by both, but is not within the exclusive domain of either."
H. FINs, ILLiOIs CoURT PRAcncE UNDER THE NEW JuDicIAY ARTICLE 36 (United States Law
Printing 1964). Under current interpretations, the statute could be construed as an unwarranted intrusion upon the inherently judicial rule-making power, or it could be nullified by
the Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of a conflicting court rule.
108. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2 (1977).
109. If the legislative intent is to be given effect, rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court under the authority expressly conferred by the Civil Practice Act,
and in implementation thereof, must be considered and construed as an integral
part of the Civil Practice Act.
Robbins v. Campbell, 65 Ill. App. 2d 478, 485, 213 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1965).
110. Supreme Court Rules are to be "supplementary to but not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act ..
" ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2 (1) (1977). See Robbins v. Campbell,
65 IIl. App. 2d 478, 485, 213 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1965); Montz v. Lester, 32 Ill. App. 2d 265, 177
N.E.2d 419 (1961).
111. Note, The Rulemaking Powers of the Illinois Supreme Court, 1965 U.ILL.L.F. 903,
913.
112. Id. at 914. See also Sunderland, Observations on the Illinois Civil PracticeAct, 28
Ill. L. Rev. 861 (1934).
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the legislature because it is not an exclusively procedural area."3 Yet
the state supreme court could assert control over evidence rules by
characterizing them as administrative matters."' As in the case of
voir dire, the court could decide that evidence is within the purview
of court administrative concerns, and that its own rules violate no
constitutional rights. The Jackson decision suggests that the substantive rights attendant upon evidence rules will not prevent the
court from declaring conflicting legislation void."' The current Illinois approach to separation of powers would enable the court to
override any proposed evidence statutes, even those receiving legislative approval."' Moreover, in the absence of a legislative enactment, the court could adopt its own evidence rules." 7 This policy
would have the singular effect of allowing the court to legislate
through the exercise of its rule-making authority."'
CONCLUSION

As a result of the expansionist trend culminating in Jackson,
legislative rule-making authority has been usurped to augment judicial power. This judicial extension demonstrates an utter disregard
for the traditional separation of powers doctrine, and contravenes
the intent of the constitutional drafters.
The altered relationship between the legislature and the judiciary
raises difficult constitutional issues. A continuation of the policy of
judicial dominance over court rules would seriously endanger the
legitimacy of the judiciary as well as the sovereignty of the legislature. It is therefore incumbent upon the Illinois courts to retreat
from the concept of enlarged judicial authority set forth in Jackson.
The judiciary must exercise its exclusive power to restrict incursion
113.

ILL.

For an example of an evidence rule affecting substantive rights, see Dead Man Act,

ANN. STAT.

ch. 51, § 2 (1977).

114. Presumably the court could acquire such control by formulating rules on its own
initiative, or by invalidating inconsistent statutory provisions.
115. See Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial
Rulemaking 55 MICH. L. Rxv. 623, 641 (1957); Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation
to JudicialRule-Making: An Appraisalof Winberry v. Salisbury 65 HAv. L. REv. 234 (1951).
116. The Illinois Supreme Court's Committee on Rules of Evidence proposed the adoption
of a modified version of the Federal Rules of Evidence on July 18, 1977. The Administrative
Office of the Illinois Courts solicited comments from February, 1978, through September,
1978. The Illinois State Bar Association has rejected the proposal as circulated. See Graham,
Introduction: The Illinois Supreme Court at the Threshold, 1978 U.ILL.L.F. 104, 110.
117. By common law decision, the Illinois Supreme Court is currently engaged in an
evolutionary creation of Illinois evidence rules.
118. Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to JudicialRule-Making: An Appraisal
of Winberry v. Salisbury 65 HAR. L. Rxv. 234 (1951).
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into the legislative domain, and restore to Illinois court rule-making
the separation of powers envisioned by the constitutional drafters.
JOANNA C.
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